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Updating Groundwater Law:
New Wine in Old Bottles
RUSSELL J. ADAMS*
There has been considerable talk, nationally, of impending water
crises.' Increasing water use, observed nationally2 and in Ohio,- is
expected to continue.4
There is reason to believe that groundwater5 will be called upon to fill
an increasing proportion of total water demand. Because of their nature,
groundwaters are typically usable without the vast expenditures necessary
to build dams and acquire surface acreage to be flooded.6 In addition,
groundwaters frequently have useful characteristics not shared with
surface waters, such as uniformity of temperature,7 composition,8 and
relative freedom from pollution.9 Such advantages have been observed in
the literature that discusses Ohio groundwater law.'0
Groundwater use is, in fact, increasing at a rate faster than surface
water use,"' heightening concern in Ohio about the ability of common-law
groundwater rules to continue distributing existing groundwater resources
beneficially, efficiently, and equitably.' 2 Under these rules, unresolvable
clashes between groundwater and surface water users are becoming
increasingly more likely. 13  Concern about conflicts between competing
groundwater users resulted recently in new legislation that allows the Ohio
Division of Water to intercede as a fact finder in disputes between
* General Counsel to the Ohio Department of Energy. Formerly Acting Deputy
Director for Legal Affairs of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources.
1. F. Moss, THE WATER CRIsIs 3,276 (1967);J. WRIoIIT, TIlE CoMiNG WATER FAMINE 15 (1966).
2. WATER RESOURCE COUNCIL, THE NATION'S WATER RESOURCES SUMMARY RIPORT 1-8 (1968).
3. Id. at 1-24.
4. A. RUDNICK, WATER USE IN OUO27 (Ohio Water Plan Inventor) Report No. 6. 1959)" WATLR
RESOURCES COUNCIL, TIE NATION'S WATER RESOURCES at 6-4-8 (1968) (both treating water use in
Ohio). ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE U.S., 1975 10 (U.S. Geological Survey Circular 765, 1977)
(treating water use nationally).
5. Groundwater means moisture occupying the interstitial spaces of subsurface sand, gravel,
rock, or other material. D. TODD, GROUNDWATER HYDROLOGY 15 (1959).
6. E. COOPER, AQUEDUCT EMPIRE 128 (1968).
7. A. Walker, Groundwater Resources of Ohio 1 (November 18, 1972) (Groundwater Seminar
sponsored by John Carroll University).
8. F. Moss, supra note 1, at35.
9. Id.
10. Coogan, Problems of Grbundwater Rights in Ohio, 9 AKRON L. REV. 34,36-37 (1975); OHlO
LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION, STAFF RESEARCII REPORT No. 115, GROUNDWATER 1 (1974).
11. C. MCGUINESS, THE ROLE OF GROUNDWATER IN THE NATIONAL WATER SITUATION 83 (U.S.
Geological Survey Water Supply Paper No. 1800, 1963); Davis, Wells and Streams: Relationship at
Law 37 Mo. L.J. 189, 198 (1972).
12. See H. Reese, Ohio Water Laws 2 (Feb. 15, 1953) (Paper delivered at the second annual Ohio
Water Clinic, Columbus, Ohio); See OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION, supra note 10,
13. Davis, supra note 11, at 198.
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competing groundwater users, but does not affect the legal rules for
allocating groundwater.
14
As Ohio groundwater use grows, a fundamental question of ground-
water allocation becomes increasingly more important: should Ohio
continue distributing groundwater according to the English absolute
ownership rule in force now,' 5 or according to the American reasonable
use rule toward which a growing number of states have gravitated,' 6 or
should Ohio follow some eastern states and allocate groundwaters through
a system of state water-use permits?' 7 This article examines the problems
that accompany each of these legal systems before proposing a "knowl-
edge doctrine" as an alternative. It is suggested that this knowledge
doctrine is consistent with the common law in general and Ohio law in
particular,' 8 and that it could easily be integrated with surface water
management rules as this becomes more desirable in the future.' 9
I. PRESENT RULES GOVERNING THE DISTRIBUTION
OF GROUNDWATER
In the twenty-seven states located either wholly or partially east of the
Mississippi River, groundwater is distributed by either of two absolute
ownership rules (the English absolute ownership rule and the American
reasonable use rule), or by water-use permit systems. Louisiana appears
to be an exception, but the rule in effect in that state operates much like the• 20
English absolute ownership rule.
The English rule, one of two absolute ownership rules,2 ' prevails at
the time of this writing in the six eastern states of Ohio,22 Maine,"
Massachusetts, 24 Mississippi, 25 Rhode Island,26 and Vermont.2 The
English rule protects landowners' rights to use for any purposes percolat-
28ing groundwaters that have been reduced to possession. Under this rule,groundwaters belong to no one until they are drawn from the ground, at
14. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1521.03(E) (Page 1978).
15. Frazierv. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 (1861).
16. See, e.g., Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Rickert, 19 Tenn. App. 446.457,89
S.W.2d 889,896 (1935).
17. OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE CO.IISSION, supra note 10, at 69-70.
18. See notes 155-90 and accompanying text infra.
19. See notes 191-204 and accompanying text infra.
20. Adams v. Grigsby, 152 So. 2d619, 623 (La. Ct. ofApp.), cert. denied,244 La. 662.152So.2d
880 (1963). Louisiana treats water as a .'fugitive mineral" like oil or gas, which belongs to any
landowner capable of"capturing" it. Id.
21. Kirkwood, Appropriation of Percolating Water, I STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1948).
22. Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294,311 (1861).
23. Chesley v. King, 74 Me. 164, 170 (1882).
24. Gamer v. Milton, 346 Mass. 617,620-21,195 N.E.2d 65,67 (1964).
25. Clark County v. Mississippi Lumber Co., 80 Miss. 535,544-45,31 So. 905,906 (1902).
26. Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 54 R.I. 411, 173 A. 627 (1934).
27. Drinkwine v. Vermont, 131 Vt. 127, 130,300 A.2d 616,618 (1973).
28. Kirkwood, supra note 21, at 2.
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which point the groundwater can be put to any use the landowner wishes,
including selling it or transporting it to non-overlying land for use.
The second absolute ownership rule is the American reasonable use
rule, which is followed in the ten eastern states of Alabama, 29 Connecti-
cut,30 Illinois, 31 Michigan, 32 New Hampshire, 33 New York,34 Pennsylva-
nia,35 Tennessee, 6 West Virginia,37 and Wisconsin.3" As under the
English rule, groundwaters belong to no one until they are drawn from the
ground. The American rule, however, protects landowners' rights to use
percolating waters only when these waters are produced and used both
reasonably and beneficially on property overlying the producing aquifer.39
When he acts otherwise, the erring user becomes liable to other overlying
owners, who have been harmed while in compliance with the rule.
The following example, modeled on the Ohio case of Frazier v.
Brown,40 illustrates the operation of these two absolute ownership rules.
F, dependent upon groundwater delivered by a spring on F's property,
loses this resource when neighbor B drills a well that lowers the water table,
and then sues B. In an English rule jurisdiction such o.s Ohio, Floses since
he gets legally enforceable rights in groundwater only when such
groundwater has been physically reduced to his possession.4, In an Ameri-
can reasonable use jurisdiction, F may win if B has not used the water
reasonably and beneficially on property which overlies42 the producing
aquifer.43  Because sales of water for use apart from the land under which
it was produced are per se unreasonable in a reasonable use jurisdiction,44
B's sale of water is likely to result in damages and an injunction in favor of
F.
45
There are several important variations of the American reasonable
29. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Wilkes, 231 Ala. 511,517, 165 So. 764,769 (1936).
30. Wadsworth v. Tillotson, 15 Conn. 366, 376 (1843).
31. See Behrens v. Scharringhausen, 22 I11. App. 2d 326, 331, 161 N.E.2d 44, 46 (1959).
32. Hart v. D'Agnostini, 7 Mich. App. 319,322, 151 N.W.2d 826, 828 (1967).
33. Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569, 573-77 (1862).
34. Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522, 526, 58 N.E. 644, 646 (1900).
35. Hatfield Twp. v. Lansdale Mun. Auth., 403 Pa. 113, 115, 168 A.2d 333,333-34 (1961).
36. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Rickert, 19 Tenn. App. 446,457, 89 S.W.2d 889,
896(1935).
37. Pence v. Carney, 58 W. Va. 296,305,52 S.E. 702,706 (1905).
38. State v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 63-Wis. 2d 278,301-02,217 N.W.2d 339,350 (1974),
modified, 63 Wis. 2d 278, 219 N.W.2d 308 (1974).
39. Rothrauffv. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 134, 14 A.2d 87, 90 (1940).
40. 12 Ohio St. 294 (1861).
41. Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235 (Exch. Ch. 1843).
42. Rothrauffv. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 134, 14 A.2d 87,90 (1940).
43. The latin roots of"aquifer are "aqua" meaning water, and "ferre," meaning to bear. Thus
an aquifer is a body of porous rock, gravel, or sand which bears water. D. TODD, supra note 5, at 15,
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Explanatory Notes § 858A, at 153 (Tent. Draft No. 17,
197 1) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
45. Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522, 522, 58 N.E. 644, 644 (1900),
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use rule. For example, the California correlative rights rule provides for
the division of available groundwaters between two competing users who
both utilize such waters reasonably and beneficially on the overlying
land.46 Another example is the American Law Institute's (ALl) redefini-
tion of the American reasonable use rule,47 which recently became the law
of Wisconsin when that state abandoned the English absolute rule.48
Broadening the existing American rule,49 the ALI rule provides for
liability of one groundwater user to competitors even when waters are used
reasonably and beneficially on the overlying land. Liability results if one
use causes "unreasonable harm through lowering of the water table or
reducing artesian pressure." 50 Applied to a dispute between F and B, a
court following the ALI rule determines whether the damage done to F by
B's use is "unreasonable."'" If B, a major water user such as a canning
plant, periodically dewaters F, a local farmer,5 2 B will be liable to F.
5 3
Permit systems have been adopted in the ten eastern states of
54  5  56 57Delaware, 4 Florida,5 5 Georgia , Indiana, Kentucky,58 Maryland, 5960 61 62 63
New Jersey, 0 North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. Four
of these jurisdictions apply their permit laws statewide54 while the
remainder selectively designate those areas where water permits must be
obtained.65
Generally, permit systems in the eastern states require named catego-
ries of water users to obtain permits.66 After considering the extent,
necessity, and ramifications of the proposed groundwater use, a managing
authority is authorized to grant water use rights for time periods ranging
46. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116,136,74 P. 766,772 (1903).
47. RESTATEMENT, supra note 44, § 858(A).
48. State v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278, 301,217 N.W.2d 339,350 (1974).
modified, 63 Wis. 2d 278,219 N.W.2d 308 (1974).
49. RESTATEMENT, supra note 44, Explanatory Notes § 858A, at 155.
50. Id., § 858A, at 156.
51. Id.
52. This situation has occurred in Ohio. OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMItSSIoN, supra note
10, at 13.
53. RESTATEMENT, supra note 44, § 858A, Comment d, at 159.
54. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6003(a)(3) (1975).
55. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.219 (West 1974).
56. GA. CODE ANN. §-17-1 106 (Supp. 1971).
57. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-2-2-5 (Burns 1973).
58. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151.140 (Baldwin 1975).
59. MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 8-802 (Supp. 1974).
60. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 58:4A-2 (West Supp. 1966).
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.15, 143-215.16 (1978).
62. S.C. CODE § 49-5-60 (1977).
63. VA. CODE § 62.1-44.97 (Supp. 1950).
64. OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION, supra note 10, at 87-89.
65. Id. at 89-93.
66. See id. at 70.
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67from years to decades. The states vary concerning whether waters may
be transferred for use away from the land from which they were produced,
and what priority of use values will be protected.68
The following example recasts Frazier as it might be litigated today
under Kentucky's permit statutes. When Fand Bboth make withdrawals
of groundwater for domestic purposes or for irrigation, they are exempted
from Kentucky's statutory requirement that they apply for and obtain
water use permits.69 But this exemption does not return them to the prior
common law of Kentucky70 because the common-law private ownership
of groundwaters was purportedly abolished by the statute.71 Since Bmay
withdraw waters without filing a permit application,72 he therefore escapes
state investigation into the impact of his water use on other groundwater
users, 73 and Fs remedy is to appeal to the legislature.
However, if Bis an industrial enterprise using more groundwater than
the limit established by regulation, '74 Bmust apply for a water use permit.7
5
When B applies for the permit, a state investigation will inquire into the
effect of B's water use on the welfare of the public in general, and on other
"public water users" in particular.76 Aggrieved parties like F have an
opportunity to articulate their problems77 and to appeal any administra-
tive action to the judicial system.78 B, of course, has the same opportuni-
ty.79
II. PROBLEMS WITH EXISTING GROUNDWATER
ALLOCATION RULES
The implementation of permit systems and the use of absolute
ownership rules have been marked by serious problems, the most
important of which is that allocation of groundwater under these
traditional rules has been carried on in a manner that is both inequitable
and economically inefficient. A discussion of these problems will
illustrate the shortcomings in existing groundwater law that adoption of
the "knowledge doctrine" would correct.
67. Id. at71. See note 131 and accompanying text supra.
68. Id.
69. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151.140 (Baldwin 1975).
70. Feldhaus v. Jefferson County, 264 Ky. 829, 833.95 S.W.2d 790. 792 (1936)
71. Ky. REv. STAT. Axx. § 151.120 (Baldwin 1975).
72. Id.§ 151.140.
73. Id.§ 151.170(2).
74. Id.§ 151.140.
75. Id.
76. Id. § 151.170(2).
77. Id. § 151.180.
78. Id.§ 151.190.
79. Id.
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A. Problems of Absolute Ownership Rules
A critical evaluation of the absolute ownership rules should, at the
outset, note the inadequacy of nineteenth century hydrological informa-
tion, that shaped the development of those rules80 and shares responsi-
bility for their present problems."' This inadequacy is illustrated by a
typical early opinion which treated the movements of percolating waters as
so "secret, occult, and concealed, that an attempt to administer any set of
legal rules in respect to them would be involved in hopeless
uncertainty .... ",82 Although this assumption of groundwater ignor-
ance may have been accurate a century ago, its continued domination of
groundwater law is inappropriate today.83 One hydrologist, writing of
persistent groundwater superstitions in the minds of both "educated" and
"uneducated men," notes that "[e]ven a judge in our courts has ruled that
'percolating water moves in a mysterious manner, in courses unknown and
unknowable.' ,84
One problem is that the absolute rules are grossly unfair. Land-
owners with more powerful pumping equipment may dewater weaker
counterparts with impunity under the English absolute rule,85 and the
American reasonable use rule permits the same result whenever the
pumpage is used reasonably and beneficially upon the overlying land. 6
The essence of the English rule has been described as might makes right,
87
a description that also applies to the American rule.88 Thejustification for
both rules goes back to the days of laissez-faire economics when notions of
rugged individualism were endorsed by courts who "simply left the parties
where competition had put them." 89 An owner of land overlying an
aquifer who has resources sufficient to obtain superior pumping
equipment can turn the aquifer solely to his own use, as long as that use is
reasonable and is confined to overlying land in an American reasonable
use jurisdiction, irrespective of the amount of land owned by him and of
the harm done to other overlying owners. Today, when the value of
farms, homes, and investments depends on wells that have been reliable for
80. See Comment, 7he Law of Underground Water; a Half-Century ofHuber v. Merkel, 1953
Wis. L. REv. 491, 492-93 (1953).
81. Murphy, Regulating Groundwater in Humid Zones, in CONTEMPORARY DEvELOPMETs iv
WATER LAw 57-58 (C. Johnson & S. Lewis eds. 1970).
82. Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294,311 (1861).
83. Coogan, supra note 10, at 40-44.
84. C. TOLMAN, GROUND WATER 22 (1937).
85. Gagnon v. French Lick Spring Hotel Co., 163 Ind. 687,697,72 N.E. 849,852 (1904).
86. See Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Wilkes, 231 Ala. 511,517, 165 So. 764,769 (1936).
87. Meeker v. City of East Orange, 77 N.J.L. 62.3,638,74 A. 379,385 (1909).
88. See Comment, supra note 80, at 500.
89. Murphy, supra note 8 1, at 55-56.
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decades, rules that give no assurance of future groundwater supplies are
unfair.90
A second problem is risk. As the owners of a "valuable hotel and
hotel plant"' 9 learned to their chagrin, the only way to guarantee one's
groundwater supply under the absolute ownership rules is to buy the
groundwater interests of every landowner with property above the same
aquifer.92  Otherwise, valuable investments can be rendered worthless
whenever a competing user comes up with a reasonable use and more
powerful pump.93 Man-made uncertainty about the continued accessibil-
ity of groundwater therefore discourages water-intensive investments. 4
Waste is a third problem associated with the absolute ownership rules.
It appears in at least three forms: groundwater waste, well-improvement
waste, and dependent resource waste. The primary reason for groundwa-
ter waste is that under competitive circumstances groundwater users race
to deplete the available resource before competitors do.95 This race elimi-
nates from consideration productive long-term projects that are not suited
to quick destruction of the resource.96
The second form of waste results from well-improvement contests.97
When the groundwater supply available to one landowner is reduced or
extinguished by competing activities that cause a lowering of the water
table, the dewatered landowner reacts by installing the smallest well or
equipment improvement sufficient to restore the flow.98 A series of these
incremental improvements will push the well's total cost far beyond that of
a well drilled to the same depth in one session. The landowner is burdened
with added expenses for unexpected well-improvement projects that arise
only because of the uncertain nature of groundwater rights under the
absolute ownership rules.99
The third variety of waste occurs when perishable resources depend-
ent on water suffer unexpected water losses. 00 The California Supreme
Court observed that:
90. Moses, Basic Groundwater Problems, 14 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 501.516(1968) (on the
rule of reasonable use).
91. Pence v. Carney, 58 W.Va. 296,298,52 S.E. 702,703 (1905).
92. See, e.g., id.
93. Id.
94. Cf. NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 228 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION] (explaining need for certainty in water law).
95. Laughlin, State Management of Ground Water Mining: A System Based on Policy, Fact and
Theory, 6 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 569, 570 (1971).
96. Note, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1419, 1422-23 (1955).
97. Comment, supra note 80, at 500.
98. See, e.g., Behrens v. Scharringhausen, 22 111. App. 2d 326, 327-28, 161 N.E.2d 44,45 (1959).
99. Comment, supra note 80, at 500.
100. See Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522,522, 58 N.E. 644, 645 (1900).
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[W]ater is necessary for domestic purposes, and for irrigating the lands of
plaintiffs, upon which there are growing trees, vines, shrubbery, and other
plants, which are of great value to plaintiffs. All of said plants will perish,
and plaintiffs will be greatly and irreparably injured, if the defendant is
allowed to divert the water.'0 1
The Court went on to adopt the correlative rights rule, 02 denying the
defendant the opportunity to dewater the plaintiff that would have existed
under either of the absolute ownership rules.
Aquifer destructibility is a fourth area where the absolute ownership
rules merit improvement. By encouraging rapid depletion of groundwa-
ter resources, these rules contribute to the geological phenomenon known
as "compacting," which occurs as the constituent particles of water-
bearing strata settle into the tiny spaces left by overpumped and retreating
waters, permanently reducing aquifer permeability. 0 3  In the eastern
states bordering salt seas, heavy pumping lowers fresh water tables, allows
the intrusion of salt waters, and leads to destruction of potable water
104
sources.
A fifth problem concerns artificial aquifer recharge that boosts
subterranean water levels through injection or induced infiltration of
surplus surface waters. 0 5 Although not heavily used in the past, artificial
recharge can be expected to increase as competition for water develops in
the future.106 But who owns spring flood waters injected0 7 or spread'08 by
a landowner desiring to store them in a natural aquifer? Existing
groundwater law was developed to cover use of natural groundwaters."'0
If injected waters are treated analogously, the absolute ownership rules
will discourage recharge, because as artificial rechargeant F adds to
existing groundwater stocks, neighbor B may legally pump and use these
and other groundwaters as quickly as they accumulate.'"'
Two additional problems are unique to the American reasonable use
variety of the absolute ownership rules. These include a market inflexibil-
ity problem and a risk problem which goes beyond that shared with the
English absolute rule.
The alienation restrictions of the American rule"' reduce the value
101. Katzv. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 138,138,70 P. 663,664(1902),aff'don rehearing, 141 Cal. 116,
74 P. 766 (1903).
102. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
103. For the effects of this compaction, see Murphy, supra note 81, at 60-61.
104. Id. at 58.
105. D. ToDD, supra note 5, at 251.
106. See Gleason, Water Projects Go Underground. 5 ECOLOGY L. Q. 625, 627-28 (1976).
107. D. TODD, supra note 5, at 260.
108. Gleason, supra note 106, at 627.
109. D. TODD, supra note 5, at 304.
H10. Cf. Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 (1861) (espousing the English absolute ownership
rule).
Ill. See Kirkwood, supra note 21, at 3.
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and usefulness of groundwater rights. Suppose neighbor C, who does not
own land over the producing aquifer, could obtain a higher rate of return
from groundwater use than the overlying owner of American reasonable
use rights. Because water sales are inherently "unreasonable" under the
American rule, contracts for such sales are subject to attack and termina-
tion at any time.' 2  Since water transfers are therefore risky and
unreliable," 3 neighbor C may be permanently separated from the only
available water supplies, and the resource is not put to its economically
best, most productive use.114
The risk problems unique to the American reasonable use rule stem
from the "reasonableness" standard that distinguishes it from the English
rule, and requires that groundwater be used reasonably on land overlying
the producing aquifer. The trend has been toward complication of the
criteria that bear on reasonableness of use."" A good example is the
"'objective reasonable use" test enunciated in the 1963 Delaware case of
MacArtor v. Gra)vlyn Crest III Swim Club, Inc.:'' '
What are the facts pertinent to the reasonable user issue? It seems clear that
defendant believed and was reasonably entitled to believe that the well it sank
would not interfere with wells such as plaintiffs'. Moreover, plaintiffs' well is
objectively marginal with a weak recovery rate. In contrast, it appears the
defendant's use is recreational. While such use is not to be condemned, it is
not entitled to quite the same consideration as a household use. I recogni7e
however that the comparative number of users may also be a relevant factor.
So far as appears only a few property owners are apparently affected, and
only the plaintiffs complain legally. Next, the defendant is withdrawing
water from the land occupied in amounts which far exceed what would be the
"normal" residential water need for such area, assuming its building density
would be about the same as that which surrounds the area. Finally, the
defendant takes a very large volume of water in concentrated periods.
10
Although the effort to minimize the unfairness of the absolute ownership
rules is admirable,'" proliferation of reasonableness criteria drastically
reduces predictability. Advance planning becomes an impossible task,
and the attendant risks discourage long-term water-intensive investments,
B. Problems of the Permit Systems
Many eastern states troubled by the flaws of the absolute ownership
rules have opted for permit systems," 9 but this alternative has problems of
112. Rothrauffv. Sinking Spring Water Co.. 339 Pa. 129. 134. 14 A.2d 87. 90 (1940)
113. Laughlin, supra note 95, at 570.
114. J. H IRSIHLEIFER, J. DE HAVEN, J. M ILLIMAN, WATER SUtPPLv 234 (1969) [hereinafter cited a,1
HIRSIILEIFER].
115. See Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859, 866 (Mo. Ct. App, 1971),
116. 41 Del. Ch. 26, 30, 187 A.2d 417, 420 (1963).
117. W.
118. Seeid. at29, 187A.2dat419.
119. See generally statutes cited notes 54-63 supra.
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its own. One problem is that the alienation restrictions of permit systems
cause economic waste.
[C]urrent laws do not effectively establish water rights as property capable of
the economic treatment accorded other types of property like land or mineral
rights. If water rights were allowed to become secure and certain without
limitation on transferability, individual decision-making and the market
process would tend to allocate water resources to their most productive use:
high-valued uses would bid the water away from low-valued uses. The
arguments for establishing water rights in this fashion are the same ones
generally justifying the market process and individual decision-making-this
process is believed to achieve high efficiency with minimal impairment of
individual freedom of choice.
120
Although a few state statutes expressly allow transfer of permits with
state authorities' permission, most do not address this point.' 2' Free
transferability of permits would defeat an important objective of permit
systems: the allocation of groundwater in accordance with a pre-
determined hierarchy of groundwater uses. 22 Since transfers are discour-
aged, groundwaters cannot move in response to market determinations of
their best, most productive use. 123  Permits, therefore, lock water into
particular uses for fixed periods of time, "even though the value of the
water on alternative lands or in alternative uses might be considerably
greater."
124
The problem of uncertainty affects both short- and long-term permit
systems. 25  Short-term permits correspondingly shorten the planning
horizon of decision makers, 26 which may preclude putting groundwaters
to their optimal uses. When permanent fixtures, such as heavy machinery,
are used in an industrial operation that is dependent upon groundwater
sources, the termination of water permits will result in marked reductions
in salvage value. 127 When the use of real property depends upon the
availability of water, uncertainty concerning renewal of short-term permits
reduces property values. 28  Long-term financing may be difficult or
expensive when repayment of loans is dependent upon the productivity of
land which is, in turn, dependent upon reissuance of short-term water-use
permits. 
29
Permits for terms of fifty years or more may lengthen decision makers'
120. HIRSIHLEIFER. supra note 114, at 234.
121. OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION. supra note 10. at 71.
122. See HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 114, at 42-43.
123. NATIONAL WATER CoMIissIoN, supra note 94, at 25 1.
124. HIRSHLEIFER. supra note 114, at 240.
125. Anderson & Rogers, Time-Limited Mater Permits: Legal and Economic Considerations. 12
GONz. L. REX. 193. 226 (1977).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 227.
129. See id. at 229.
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planning horizons, but toward the end of their legal life they produce the
same economic distortions as short-term permits. Investment in real
property and personal property with a useful life beyond the expiration
date of a permit may be discouraged in businesses that rely upon ground-
water because termination of the permit would preclude the business from
earning the desired rate of return on the investment. In purchasing a
permanent fixture that could not be moved without prohibitive cost, the
businessman runs the risk of ending up with a piece of machinery with only
scrap value after the termination of a water permit, when the purchaser
expected to utilize that machinery as a source of earning power for the
remainder of its useful life. Other drawbacks appear in the centralized
administration of permit systems. Regulatory lag between requests for
action and response by authorities is a threatening problem in permit
system jurisdictions.t30 This is worrisome because of the permit adminis-
tration need for large amounts of very current information. The grant of a
groundwater permit usually requires the state agency to study the impact
of the proposed groundwater use upon local patterns of water use and
make an assessment about its value. Typically, this weighing must take
into account rmany considerations, some of which are changing on a
continuing basis. Such changing considerations might include: the
number of parties using an aquifer, and the extent of their uses; the uses to
which the groundwater in a particular aquifer are being put, and the utility
of those uses; diversions from or reduction of flows in surface water-
courses.' 3  Final decisions on the allocation of limited groundwater
supplies necessitate an evaluation of an extremely complex and changing
set of circumstances, and should be based upon cuirent data. Delays in
action on groundwater permit allocations, which appear likely in central-
130. Delays of up to ten years have occurred in the similarly rcgulated utility law area. M,
FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, PUBLIC UTILITIES 163 (1973).
131. The following is taken from a typical permit system statute, and suggests some of the
considerations the state agency must weigh in granting groundwater permits:
In adopting any regulations pursuant to the provisions of G.S. 143-215.14. and in
considering permit applications, revocations or modifications under this section. the Lnvir-
onmental Management Commission shall consider:
(I) The number of persons using an aquifer or stream and the object, extent and
necessity of their respective withdrawals or uses;
(2) The nature and size of the stream or aquifer.
(3) The physical and chemical nature of any impairment of the aquifer or stream,
adversely affecting its availability or fitness for other water uses (including public use):
(4) The probable severity and duration of such impairment under foreseeable
conditions;
(5) The injury to public health, safety or welfare which would result if such
impairment were not prevented or abated;
(6) The kinds of businesses or activities to which the various uses are related.
(7) The importance and necessity of the uses claimed by permit applicants (under
this section), or of the water uses of the area (under G.S. 143-215.14) and the extent of any
injury or detriment caused or expected to be caused to other water uses (including public use):
(8) Diversion from or reduction of flows in other watercourses or aquifers; and
(9) Any other relevant factors.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.15(h)(1978).
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ized permit systems, will lead to unsound and inefficient groundwater
allocation decisions.
In sum, permit systems suffer from serious problems. They are not,
however, the only alternative to the law of absolute ownership.
III. THE KNOWLEDGE DOCTRINE: AN ALTERNATIVE
The absolute ownership rules are based on the principle "which gives
to the owner of the soil all that lies beneath his surface . . . whether it is
solid rock, or porous ground, or venous earth, or part soil, part water." "-'
Though hydrological knowledge was not sufficiently developed to enable
the landowner to determine how much water was naturally in place
"beneath his surface"' 33 in the past, it now can. 134 The common law is
intended to evolve with changing times. 35 Since the absolute ownership
rules were originally predicated on groundwater ignorance, 36 those rules
should evolve to reflect increasing groundwater knowledge.13 7 To this
end, the "knowledge doctrine" would accord the owner of land a right to
the groundwater actually contained in the soil beneath his land, which
amount of groundwater can now be measured with some precision.
If under absolute ownership theory percolating water belongs to the
landowner in the same fashion as soil or rocks, 38 then it should belong to
one landowner only to the extent that groundwaters are naturally in place
below that landowner's tract. Suppose landowner F lives above an
aquifer whose groundwaters are in gradual but constant, roughly
unidirectional, motion. 9  Waters impregnate this body through
infiltration from lakes, rivers, surface runoff and assorted human
sources. 40  Such waters may be categorized on the basis of their time of
arrival: those that have arrived within the most recent year comprise the
yearly net "recharge" pool, and those that have accumulated within the
aquifer over previous years, the "storage" pool.' 4' Each pool can be
further subdivided into the smaller "tract" pools defined by the surface
areas they underlie. With these notions in mind, the English absolute rule
can evolve to allow groundwater to be treated like rocks and sand 42 so that
132. Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235 (Exch. Ch. 1843).
133. Id.
134. See Clark, The Role of State Legislation in Ground Water Management, 10 CREIGIrro'N L.
REv. 469,476 (1977).
135. State %. Michels Pipeline Constr.. Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278. 294-96. 217 N.W.2d 339. 346-4
(1974).
136. Comment, supra note 80, at 492, 493.
137. State v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 63 Wis. 2d 278, 294-96. 217 N.W.2d 339. 36-48
(1974).
138. Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235 (Exch. Ch. 1843).
139. D. TODD. supra note S. at 5.
140. Id. at 5-7.
141. See Clark. supra note 134, at 476.
142. Acton v. Blundell. 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235 (Exch. Ch. 1843).
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one landowner will not be allowed to use the resources of another without
permission. 143  Buttressed by a "knowledge doctrine," the English rule
could protect a landowner's right to use groundwaters in an amount not
exceeding that landowner's subjacent tract storage poolI 44 plus the tract
recharge.145  The knowledge doctrine could similarly modify the
American reasonable use rule, although there would appear to be no good
reason to sustain that rule's ban on transferring waters away from the
overlying land.1
46
If F is dewatered by B in a jurisdiction applying the knowledge
doctrine to the English absolute rule, Fs remedy depends on whether B is
143. Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522, 524, 58 N.E. 644, 545 (1900).
144. An Ohio plaintiff might develop this information with expert assistance through state
groundwater studies that relate to the area involved. For example, a plaintifffrom Venice, Ohio might
consult G. Dove, A Hydrologic Study of the Valley-Fill Deposits in the Venice Area. Ohio (Technical
Report No. 4, Ohio Department of Natural Resources, Division of Water, 1961). After learning that
the specific yield of gravel deposits there would amount to 31 billion gallons. the plaintiff might adjust
this figure downward to represent the portion of the aquifer storage pool that underlies the particular
property analyzed. Id.at25. The State of Ohio has done numerous groundwater studies, particularly
in areas troubled by groundwater problems, and these are listed in a 1975 pamphlet called
PUBLICATIONS (Ohio Department of Natural Resources, Division of Water, 1975). Background
materials supporting some of these groundwater reports are also available in the open files of
the Groundwater Inventory section of the Division of Water.
In the event that additional accuracy is desired or that no study is available, the plaintiff might
consult Ohio's water well log file. There are data from over 300,000 water well logs on record with the
state, and 15,000 more are added every year. A. WALKER, supra note 7, at 6. This file has been said to
be "perhaps the largest file of water well records in the United States." GROUNDWA'rLR FOR
PLANNING IN SOUTHWEST OHIO 49 (Ohio Department of Natural Resources, Division of Water, 1972).
While these logs vary both in quality and content, they generally report basic data about the
geological formations that well drillers in the locale have encountered; this may facilitate judgments
about the specific yields of a particular aquifer.
In a few cases, information may be obtained through analysis of well cuttings and cores that
have been collected by the Ohio Geological Survey. LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 22 (Ohio Department of
Natural Resources, Division of Geological Survey, 1977). Where no information is available from any
of these sources, test borings may be necessary to assess the value of groundwater storage beneath a
particular parcel of property,
145. An Ohio plaintiff might develop recharge information much as he would obtain storage
pool figures. The crucial variables are surface water infiltration, precipitation, percolation, and buried
valley wall seepage. GROUNDWATER FOR PLANNING IN SOUTIWEST OtO 54 (Ohio Department ol
Natural Resources, Division of Water, 1972). In particular, "[t]he most important parameter is sur-
face water infiltration because it generally represents the replenishment source of largest magnitude,"
Id.
A plaintiff in southwestern Ohio, the area that accounts for half of the state's total groundwater
use, might establish these variables by consulting the SOUTHWEST 01110 WATER PLAN (Ohio Depart-
ment of Natural Resources, April 1976). This report indicates that average stream bed leakage rates
range from 0.1 to 0.45 million gallons per day from each acre of bed, per foot of head. Id, at 175.
Stream infiltration can be approximated by measuring the acreage of stream bed on a particular
property and the mean water depth. Similarly, basic data concerning rainwater percolation recharge
and buried valley wall recharge are available. Id. at 176. For plaintiffs ib other parts ofthe state, one
of the four other regional water plans might be consulted.
In the future, the availability of information along these lines is likcly to improve considerably.
For example, in 1972 consultants to the State of Ohio recommended more intensive investigations in
the areas of Southwest Ohio where maximum aquifer development is expected to occur, to "evaluate
the infiltration capabilities of these systems," GROUNDWATER FOR PLA NING IN SOUTWI ST 01110,
supra, at 55. As such studies are undertaken, recharge quantities will be more easily proved.
Although approximations developed in this manner are likely to be rough, they may be modified
as better information becomes available. Moreover, a party unhappy with an opponent's approxinia-
tions is free to suggest and support better estimates.
146. See HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 114.
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using more groundwater than the share rightfully owned by B. By
introducing expert testimony, F could prove the total amounts of
accessible groundwater naturally in place beneath each property owners'
holdings. If B's property has, at the time suit is filed, stored over prior
years a total of 200,000 acre-feet of accessible groundwater, and an
additional 10,000 acre-feet accrue naturally to Hfs land as net recharge
yearly, B may make withdrawals only to the extent that these numbers are
not exceeded. When B has taken 250,000 acre-feet in the first two years of
well operation, B may be enjoined from taking quantities in subsequent
years unless water rights are purchased from F. Under the proposed
doctrine, B has a legitimate claim only to use the one-time quantity of
200,000 acre-feet, plus 20,000 acre-feet representing two years of recharge
at 10,000 acre-feet annually.
The feasibility of applying the knowledge doctrine will vary from one
locale to another in proportion to the amount of groundwater knowledge
available for the area. 47 In some areas, there may already be sufficient
hydrological data available to determine the groundwater present in
particular parcels of land. 148 Where tract-specific hydrological informa-
tion is poor, studies could be made to establish the exact size of a given
landowner's storage and yearly recharge rights by examining aquifer
porosities, 149 thicknesses, and related information. A less expensive
alternative would be to base a given landowner's surface rights upon the
ratio of his land area to the total land area overlying the aquifer.
Application of this ratio to the aquifer's total storage and recharge
quantities would give a measure of the individual landowner's storage and
recharge rights. 150 If knowledge is not available or is too expensive for 2
plaintiff's purposes,' the groundwater ignorance assumption could b,
affirmed as automatically as in the earliest cases'5 2 and the groundwater
rule prevailing in the jurisdiction could be applied.
Courts hesitant to update absolute ownership law with the knowledge
doctrine could be assisted through legislation. State agencies, which
would otherwise issue permits, could instead be used as fact-finding bodies
to determine aquifer storage and recharge quantities, and to break them
into individualized storage and recharge figures. Incorporation of
knowledge doctrine principles into the framework of existing groundwater
law would be a manageable task, and would contribute to a more efficient
and equitable system of groundwater use.
147. See Coogan, supra note 10, at 44.
148. See note 142 supra.
149. See C. TOLMAN, supra note 84, at 482-485.
150. Cf. Clark. supra note 134, at 476 (discussing Oklahoma permit system).
151. Coogan, supra note 10, at44.
152. See generally materials cited at notes 155-57 infra.
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IV. ADVANTAGES OF THE KNOWLEDGE DOCTRINE ALTERNATIVF
The knowledge doctrine alternative has several important advantages
over existing methods of allocating groundwaters. It addresses the
mentioned faults of both forms of absolute ownership rules,53 and
answers problems of existing groundwater permit systems as well.', 4
Whenever the absolute rules are unfair because they condition
groundwater rights on pumping strength, the knowledge doctrine would
instead correlate groundwater rights with the natural storage and recharge
qualities of each pumper's realty. Knowledge doctrine rights would not be
subject to the rampages of any late-comer with a deeper well and a more
powerful pump, and investors would not be called upon to shoulder the
risk that competing users will pirate their groundwater supplies.
When groundwater waste occurs under existing law because ground-
water users compete to deplete the resource, each owner of rights under the
knowledge doctrine would be able to legally shield those rights from the
predations of others. The occurrence of well-improvement waste as
dewatered landowners are forced to make unexpected, unscheduled
improvements would be diminished, because groundwater users would be
able to predict neighbors' maximum groundwater consumption. Waste
of perishable resources resulting from competitors' unexpected water uses
would similarly decline.
Under the absolute ownership rules, responsible landowners are
powerless to stop destruction of their aquifers by irresponsible groundwat-
er users whose excessive pumping causes compaction or salt water
intrusion. Under the knowledge doctrine, however, irresponsible
pumpers who use up their own waters would be forced to buy more from
others or do without. Responsible landowners would be unlikely to sell
cheaply, if they know that the purchaser would destroy the aquifer
entirely by excessive pumping. The artificial recharge problem would
be eliminated because landowners' withdrawal rights would grow
automatically as they artificially expand their yearly recharge pools.
The alienation and uncertainty problems unique to the reasonable use
rule may be addressed in at least two ways. First, the reasonable use rule
could be abandoned- in favor of the English rule supplemented by the
knowledge doctrine. The American rule's prime purpose is to redress
unfairness problems of the English rule that could be more completely
remedied by the knowledge doctrine. Alternatively, once the reasonable
use rule is combined with the knowledge doctrine, the former could be
modified to permit groundwater sales and to simplify and clarify the
factors bearing on "reasonableness." These changes would resolve aliena-
tion problems associated with the American reasonable use rule, while
improving predictability and limiting risk in the groundwater rights area.
153. See notes 80-118 and accompanying text supra.
154. See notes 119-31 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 39:520
GROUND WATER LAW
The knowledge doctrine similarly addresses the mentioned faults of
the permit systems. Permit systems disallow economically efficient
market allocation of groundwaters by restricting alienation, but know-
ledge doctrine rights are not so restricted. Whereas permit systems,
because of their temporary nature, generate uncertainty about the future
availability of groundwater, the knowledge doctrine would create legally
enforceable rights to specific quantities of water. Thus, the knowledge
doctrine would reduce risk and encourage sales to those able to achieve
greatest return. Finally, under the knowledge doctrine private rights
could be allocated privately to minimize the need for centralization with its
attendant bureaucratic complexity and regulatory lag. Regulatory
agencies would be called upon to adjust private rights only when problems
develop.
V. COMPATIBILITY OF THE KNOWLEDGE DOCTRINE WITH THE
ASSERTED GOALS OF EXISTING GROUNDWATER
ALLOCATION RULES
A brief survey of the cases decided under the absolute ownership rules
reveals that these early decisions are astonishingly consistent with the
knowledge doctrine, and that virtually all of the apparent inconsistencies
are attributable to the inadequacy of nineteenth century hydrological
information. The foregoing observation is true of the cases that first
articulated the English absolute rule,"5 and of those that originally
articulated the American reasonable use rule. 5 6 It is also true of Frazier v.
Brown,15 7 which adopted the English absolute rule in Ohio.
In Frazier v. Brown,'5" plaintiff Frazier used spring waters for
domestic and agricultural purposes. In 1856 neighbor Brown dug a well
that destroyed Frazier's spring. Frazier sued, arguing unsuccessfully for
the application of surface stream riparian principles to groundwaters.
The court's holding was based on two considerations. First, the court
observed that "recognition of any correlative rights, would inter-
fere - . . with the general progress of improvement in works of embellish-
ment and utility.' 59 A century later there is concern, ironically, that the
absolute rule adopted in Frazier interferes with development of commerce
and industry by discouraging water-dependent investments.160 Imple-
mentation of knowledge doctrine principles would, on the other hand,
provide business investors with a certain groundwater supply and a means
of obtaining additional groundwater, if needed. The business risk asso-
ciated with the uncertainty of continued groundwater supply under the
155. Chasemore v. Richards, II Eng. Rep. 140 (Exch. Ch. 1859); Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng.
Rep. 1223 (Exch. Ch. 1843). See Note, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1419, 1421 (1955).
156. Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439, (1870); Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co.,43 N.H. 569,(1862).
157. 12 Ohio St. 291 (1861).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 311.
160. Coogan, supra note 10, at 42.
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English absolute ownership rule would be minimized, and investment
encouraged.
161
The court also felt that groundwater knowledge was so poor that "an
attempt to administer any set of legal rules in respect to [groundwaters]
would be . . . practically impossible."'162  Despite this reasoning, the
Frazier court did recognize the principle that groundwater "is to be
regarded as part of the land itself, to be enjoyed absolutely by the
proprietor within whose territory it is,' 163 even though groundwater
knowledge was then insufficient to determine the territorial boundaries.
The implication was that when such knowledge became available,
groundwater law would be updated to reflect that knowledge.
The rule adopted in Frazier can be traced back to Acton v. Blundell,'64
which the Frazier court called "thoroughly argued and considered.' ' 6 5 In
Acton v. Blundell, defendant Blundell sank two mineshafts less than three-
quarters of a mile from plaintiff Acton's well. Operation of mine drainage
equipment interfered with Acton's groundwater supply; he filed suit,
arguing in vain that existing watercourse rules should be extended to
groundwater. The Acton court observed that the source of riparian law
was either "mutual consent or agreement"'' 66 or a "positive law . . . in-
ferred from long-continued acquiescence'' 67 of neighboring landowners,
but that these rationales could not be carried over to groundwater
because "the very existence of the underground springs . . . may be
unknown to the proprietors of the soil.' 68
This disposition of the watercourse argument made necessary the
invention of a special rule governing rights in oozing groundwaters. For
guidance, Chief Justice Tindal turned to foundational property principles
in the form of the cujus est solum169 doctrine:
[T]he present case . . . falls within the principle which gives to the owner of
soil all that lies beneath his surface; that the land immediately below is his
property, whether it is solid rock, or porous ground, or venous earth, or part
soil, part water; that the person who owns the surface may dig therein, and
apply all that is there found to his own purpose; at his free will and
pleasure .... 170
Followed strictly, this principle should have given landowners rights to use
161. Murphy, supra note 81, at 57.
162. Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294,311 (1861).
163. Id. at 308.
164. 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1233 (Exch. Ch. 1843).
165. Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 310 (1861).
166. Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1233 (Exch. Ch. 1843),
167. Id. at 1234.
168. Id.
169. Cujus est solem ejus est usque ad coehm et ad infernos translates literally to, "Hi iq his
alone and is from the heavens to the depths of the earth." Coogan. supra note 10. at 39,
170. Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235 (Exch. Ch. 1843).
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groundwaters naturally located beneath and within the boundaries of their
own property. This result could not be achieved without exacting
knowledge of the quantity and location of subjacent groundwaters.
Tindal judicially noticed that nineteenth century hydrology was ignorant
of such matters:
[Underground water] does not flow openly in the sight of the neighbouring
proprietor, but through the hidden veins of the earth beneath its surface:
...no proprietor knows what portion of water is taken from beneath his
own soil: how much he gives originally, or how much he transmits only, or
how much receives ....
Unable to establish the quantities of groundwater in place below each
landowners' surface rights, Tindal said: "[I]f, in the exercise of such right,
he intercepts or drains off the water collected from underground springs in
his neighbor's well, this inconvenience to his neighbour falls within the
description of damnum absque injuria, which cannot become the ground
of an action."1' 2 If Tindal and the defendant had been able to assess what
portion of water was taken from below the defendant's own soil, and how
much from the area below the neighbors' soil, the English rule might well
have been different.
Three separate expressions of Justice Tindal support such a supposi-
tion. First, Chief Justice Tindal said:
But if the man who sinks the well in his own land can acquire by that act an
absolute and indefeasible right to the water that collects in it, he has the power
of preventing his neighbor from making any use of a spring in his own soil
which shall interfere with the enjoyment of the well. He has the power, still
further, of debarring the owner of the land in which the spring is first
found .. .from the proper cultivation of the soil.
173
Extension of riparian law to percolating groundwaters would have created
an "indefeasible right" that would interfere with the proper cultivation of
soil. But adherence to the English absolute ownership rule creates a
similar right that interferes with "the proper cultivation of the soil'
' 74
when one well owner gains the mechanical "power of preventing his
neighbor from making any use of a spring in his own soil."'' 75 Chief Justice
Tindars economic values are sacrificed on both horns of this dilemma only
because nineteenth century hydrology was unable to achieve a finer
splitting of water rights.
Second, Chief Justice Tindal feared that extension of riparian law to
percolating groundwaters would "impose on a neighbor the necessity of
bearing a heavy expense if [he] has erected machinery for the purposes of
171. Id. at 1233.
172. Id. at 1235.
173. Id. at 1234.
174. Id.
175. Id.
1978]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
mining and discovers when too late that the appropriation of water has
already been made."'' 76 Because of the risk associated with the absolute
rule, failure to adhere to the knowledge doctrine may also impose a
surprise "necessity of bearing a heavy expense"' 7 on any party whose
investments depend on the continued availability of groundwater. The
knowledge doctrine would serve to eliminate the risk under absolute
ownership rules of sudden and unexpected depletion or exhaustion of
groundwater supplies, a risk that Chief Justice Tindal recognized in 1843,
but was unable to eliminate because of limited hydrological knowledge.
Third, Chief Justice Tindal feared that the "advantage on one side,
and the detriment to the other [might] bear no proportion"'178 were riparian
law extended to groundwater. Yet his Acton rule allows one pumper to
dewater neighboring hospitals and all other entities with complete disre-
gard whether the "advantage on one side" bears any relationship to the
"detriment on the other."' 7 9 Chief Justice Tindal had no alternative at the
time.
The rationale underlying adoption of the American reasonable use
rule is also supportive of knowledge doctrine principles. The seminal
American reasonable use rule case is the decision of the New York Court of
Appeals in Forbellv. City- of New York.' 80 In that case, the plaintiff's land
had been rendered unfit for the growing of celery and water cresses because
the' groundwater table beneath his land had been lowered when the
defendant city pumped groundwater from adjacent land and sold it to city
residents. The court conceded that strict application of the English
absolute ownership rule would necessitate ajudgment for the defendant,""1
and purported to continue its adherence to that rule. 82 Nevertheless, a
judgment for the plaintiff for damages and an injunction was affirmed with
the court fashioning what has come to be known as the American
reasonable use rule, although the court regarded its decision as merely a
limitation upon the English rule.
The court held that a landowner could make any "reasonable" use of
groundwater extracted from his land. Reasonable uses of groundwater
did not include merchandising of water for use on land that did not over-
lay the groundwater reservoir:
[TJo fit it up with wells and pumps of such pervasive and potential reach that
from their base the defendant can tap the water stored in the plaintifis land,
and in all the region thereabout, and lead it to his own land, and by
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 164 N.Y. 522,58 N.E. 644 (1900).
181. Id. at 525, 58 N.E. at 645.
182. Id.
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merchandising it prevent its return, is . . . unreasonable as to the plaintiff
and the others whose lands are thus clandestinely sapped, and their value
impaired." 3
The landowner's right of absolute ownership of groundwater extract-
ed from his land derived from the principle "that the water stored or held in
[the landowner's] soil so long as it remains there is-unlike water flowing
in a surface stream-a part of the soil itself,"' 84 which is the precept upon
which the knowledge doctrine is based. At the time of Forbell, however,
the court was faced with the problem "that the percolation and under-
ground flow of water are out of sight and their exact operation and courses
are conjectural and not susceptible of actualobservation and proof.' 185 It
was for this reason that the landowner's rights to the groundwater were
limited to reasonable use on overlying land; since it was not then possible
to discern how much groundwater was held in each landowner's soil, strict
application of the English rule would have allowed a landowner to pump
off tremendous amounts of groundwater for purposes of sale, even though
an unknown and unknowable part of that groundwater might well have
been taken from his neighbor's soil. By limiting the amount of ground-
water each landowner could use to an amount that could be used
reasonably on overlying land, the Forbell court was in essence attempting,
as best it could in the context of groundwater ignorance that existed then,
to limit each landowner's rights to groundwater in a manner that would
reasonably approximate that unknown amount of groundwater that he
actually owned because it was held in his soil.
Thus, the American reasonable use rule and the knowledge doctrine
are in fundamental accord that a landowner owns "the water stored or held
in his soil.' 86 The only discrepancy between the two-namely, that the
American rule limits the landowner's right to groundwater to that amount
that can be used reasonably on overlying land-is attributable to earlier
technological inability to determine how much groundwater is, in fact,
held in a certain piece of land. Hydrological knowledge is now sufficient
to make that determination, and the knowledge doctrine simply utilizes
that knowledge to accord each landowner the groundwater rights that the
authors of the American reasonable use rule agreed were his, that is, the
right to the groundwater contained in the soil beneath his land, but were
unable to protect because of the then mysterious movement of
groundwater.
Both the English absolute rule and the American reasonable use rule
recognize as axiomatic "that the owner of the soil may lawfully occupy the
space above as well as below the surface to any extent that he pleases"'
187
183. Id. at 526, 58 N.E. at 646.
184. Id. at 525, 58 N.E. at 645.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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and "[t]hat a different rule would prevent the reasonable use and
improvement of land."' 88  In the case of both rules, this has led to a
derivative proposition that a landowner has an absolute right to the
groundwater beneath his land, although hydrological knowledge available
to the courts fashioning those rules could not isolate that right with
precision.' 89 The knowledge doctrine reflects advances in groundwater
information that allow the law to accurately define that groundwater
under a landowner's property and finally heed the principle upon which
both absolute ownership rules are based, "which gives to the owner of the
soil all that lies beneath his surface . . . whether it is solid rock, or porous
ground, or venous earth, or part soil, part water."190
VI. INTEGRATING SURFACE AND GROUNDWATER REGULATION
A major goal of modern water policy should be to maximize the
benefits available through use of all water resources,191 whether of surface
or underground origin. This becomes more important as water use grows;
eventually, all waters will have to be regulated as part of the same hydrolo-
gical system. 192 To this end, the comparative qualities of each water source
must be recognized. For example, surface waters have value for naviga-
tion, power generation, and recreation193 They may harbor endangered
species.' 94 Although groundwaters do not share these intrinsic values,
they may establish the water table upon which surface flows and surface
storage are based.' 95 Additionally, groundwaters may have uniform
temperature characteristics that make them more desirable for some
purposes than surface waters. 1
96
Present law does not coordinate its treatment of both sources of
water, either to maximize benefits or otherwise. For example, in the
eastern states riparian law usually defines surface water rights. 97 This law
gives landowners with property adjacent to, and bordering on rivers the
right to have river waters maintained in their natural mode, course, and
volume,198 subject only to the reasonable needs of other riparian owners.199
188. Id.
189. See notes 170 & 184 and accompanying text supra.
190. Acton v. Blundell, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235 (Exch. Ch. 1843).
191. See NATIONAL WATER COM1MISSION, supra note 94, at 233.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 6.
194. See United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313,315 (9th Cir. 1974), aft'd, 426 U.S. 128 (1976);
Brief of Amicus Curiae at 1-3, Columbus v. Teater, 53 Ohio St. 2d 253 (1978).
195. Stevens v. Spring Valley Water Works and Supply Co., 42 Misc. 2d 86,95,247 N.Y,S.2d
503, 511 (Sup. Ct. 1964), af'd, 255 N.Y.S. 2d 466 (App. Div. 1964).
196. A. Walker, supra note 7.
197. Davis, supra note 11, at 199.
198. Columbus & Hocking Coal & Iron Co. v. Tucker, 48 Ohio St. 41, 57, 26 N.E. 630, 632
(1861).
199. Maloney & Plager, Florida's Lakes: Problems in a Water Paradise, 13 U. FLA. L. Rhv. I,
52 (1960).
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Existing riparian law, however, "says nothing about the rights of riparians
who are injured by diverters of groundwater which feeds a surface
watercourse.,,20° The common law groundwater rules are hardly better.
"They do not address themselves to possible conflicts between a user of
percolating groundwater and a user of a hydrologically related surface
,watercourse.,,200 The common-law groundwater rules are hardly better.
Given this predicament, the National Water Commission has recom-
mended that "[s]tates in which ground water is an important source of
supply commence conjunctive management of surface waters .... '1202
A typical approach has been to establish permit systems for all consump-
tive uses of water,203 but this subjects groundwater to the disadvantages
previously discussed.2°' A better alternative would combine a surface
water permit system with groundwater regulation under the khowledge
doctrine. By giving private landowners a greater stake in the long term
well-being of both their groundwater resources and the aquifer that
stores them, the knowledge doctrine should reduce the necessity for, and
thus the cost of groundwater regulation. At the same time, the rights of
surface water permit holders and owners of land containing groundwater
could be clearly defined, and could be the subject of private negotiation
between conflicting groundwater and surface water users rather than the
focus of litigation in the courts.
VII. CONCLUSION
Early groundwater cases established absolute ownership rights be-
cause it was then impossible to divide groundwaters into portions bearing
any rational relationship to the producing property. But these unrestrict-
ed rights resulted in unfairness, risk, waste, aquifer destruction, limitations
upon the utility of artificial recharge, and economic inflexibility that
troubled even the earliest judges. Since then advancing technology has
increased our options. Progress has made possible a knowledge doctrine
capable of addressing many of the problems of the absolute rules by
protecting a landowner's right to use groundwaters in an amount not
exceeding that landowner's subjacent storage and yearly recharge pools.
With existing law laboring under the burden of increasing water use, it
is important that the shaping of future groundwater law be done with an
eye on many goals. Tomorrow's groundwater law should be economically
sound; it should complement the regulation of surface waters; and it
should be fair. The knowledge doctrine seems likely to make an effective
contribution toward these ends.
200. Davis, supra note 11, at 199.
201. Id.at204.
202. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 94, at 234.
203. Maloney & Ausness, A Modern Proposal for State Regulation of Consumptive Uses of
Water, 22 HASTINGS L. J. 525,525-26 (1972).
204. See text accompanying notes 129-41 supra.
1978]
